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Valuing Medieval Annuities: Were Corrodies Underpriced? 








Medieval bishops condemned and restricted the sale of corrodies (a type of annuity), 
partly  on  the  grounds  of  their  perceived  unprofitability.  The  available  data  on  the 
profitability of corrodies is limited and little analysed, and the episcopal condemnation 
of corrodies has been adopted by modern researchers. After recognising the difficulties, 
this paper applies an annuity pricing model to study corrody pricing.  Given various 
assumptions, contrary to the established view, it is argued that the sale of corrodies was 
financially  profitable  for  institutions.  Finally,  some  reasons  are  considered  for  the 
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1  Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the provision of corrodies, a form of pension, by medieval religious 
institutions  in  England.  This  paper  is  the  first  to  explore  the  pricing  of  corrodies  using  actuarial 
techniques, and sets out to challenge the prevailing view that monasteries sold corrodies at uneconomic 
prices. It finds evidence supporting the view that, if anything, corrodies were sold at a profit.  
 
This finding is consistent with the many examples in financial economics of prices being set more or 
less in accordance with undiscovered pricing models; for instance option prices reflected the Black-
Scholes option pricing model well before it was published (Black and Scholes, 1972; Moore and Jun, 
2006). Looking for further historical evidence, it has been shown that over the period 1723-1794 prices 
on the London and Amsterdam stock markets moved in accordance with the weak form of the efficient 
markets hypothesis proposed by Fama (Neil, 1990; Fama, 1965). Similarly, between 1771 and 1777 the 
prices in Amsterdam of three English stocks moved in response to the arrival of news, consistent with 
weak form efficiency (Koudijs, 2009). For 1728-1761 it has been demonstrated that yields on bonds 
issued by the East India Company correctly reflected the put and call options embedded in these bonds 
(Marco and Malle-Sabouret, 2007). From a medieval perspective, it has been demonstrated that advance 
contracts in wool from the thirteenth century were priced in accordance  with the valuation formula 
developed  in  the  last  few  decades  to  price  forwards  contracts  (Bell,  Brooks  and  Moore,  2009). 
Furthermore, it is argued that the behaviour of medieval lenders matches the predictions of rational 
behaviour given by a theoretical model of debt markets incorporating the ban on usury (Koyama, 2008). 
In addition, it has also been found that modern microstructure models of volatility clustering for both 
prices and bid-ask spreads applied in early renaissance Florence (Booth and Gurun, 2008). The analysis 
of corrody pricing in this paper presents additional evidence in favour of the rationality of medieval 
price  setters,  supporting  the  application  of  modern  pricing  models  to  medieval  problems  (Nau  and 
Schefold, 2002). 
 
Under a corrody, an individual or couple was provided by a religious institution such as a monastery, 
priory, abbey or hospital with some agreed mixture of food, drink, heat, light, accommodation, clothing, 
laundry, health care, maybe a small monetary allowance and even stabling and grazing for their livestock 
(Williams, 1983, pp. 288-294).
1 Initially the word corrody referred to food and lodging supplied by 
vassals to the lord on his circuit, and the first usage of the word in the sense it is used in this paper was 
in  1197  (Wilson  and  Jones,  1917,  p.  5).  Each  corrody  was  negotiated  and  recorded,  and  the  terms 
differed between deals, although there tended to be accepted grades of corrody (Harvey, 1993, pp. 181-
184; Keil, 1963-64, pp. 113-114; Cullum, 1991, p. 9). For purchased corrodies the value of the goods 
                                                 
1 Some corrodians were granted the use of a garden (Little, 1958, p. 12).  
  2 
and services supplied varied with the purchase price.
2 
 
Since it involved the supply of a specified quantity of goods and services for the life of the corrodian, a 
corrody can be compared to a life annuity. Equating corrodies with life annuities is common practice 
throughout the existing literature, and the equivalence is maintained in this paper.  The church sold 
annuities from the eighth century onwards, and by the fourteenth century the sale of annuities was an 
established  activity  (Jack,  1912,  pp.  170,  174).  There  was  no  hard  and  fast  dividing  line  between 
corrodies and pensions (annuities); as corrodies could turn into pensions when the benefit was provided 
in cash, not in goods and services (Cook, 1961, p. 21; Keil, 1963-64, p. 116; Snape, 1926, p. 139; 
Thompson, 1928, p. 117; 1947, p. 175; Tillotson, 1974, p. 133; Williams, 1983, pp. 78, 86-87). The 
institutions probably possessed significant economies of scale in the provision of food and shelter, for 
instance cooking communal meals. Therefore the marginal cost to the institution of providing the goods 
and  services  comprising  a  corrody  was  less  than  if  the  institution  had  provided  the  corrodian  with 
sufficient money to purchase these items themselves. Because a corrody usually involved the supply of 
goods and services, rather than cash, it was effectively inflation proof. 
 
There were, of course, other methods of providing for old age in medieval times. For example, the 
family could provide its own form of longevity insurance.  Using a theoretical model with assumed 
parameters, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) demonstrate that families of just three people can provide over 
70% of the benefits of fairly priced annuities. Under this model, parents promise to leave all their assets 
to their child, in return for their child agreeing to support them until their death. They calculate that this 
would give the parents 71% of the gain from a fair annuity contract, while the child would gain 45% of 
the benefits that would have been available to them from using annuities. Using historical examples, 
Clark describes how in medieval times the elderly entered into agreements with their children (or others) 
under which they worked their parents’ land and supported them until their death in return for inheriting 
the land. Such arrangements had the advantage that the pensioners did not have to relocate from their 
familiar surroundings (Clark, 1982; 1990).
3 One further alternative to buying a corrody was for people to 
sell their land for a cash sum, which was paid in installments over a number of years (i.e. an annuity 
certain), or for the life of the vendor, i.e. a level life annuity (Clarke, 1982; 1990). The existence of these 
alternatives to corrodies means that, not only would institutions have competed with each other when 
pricing these products, but also with these close substitutes. 
                                                 
2 There were other types of corrody, such as those awarded by the King or the patron of the institution for service, 
by the institution to its servants, and in exchange for a transfer of property. The analysis in this paper concentrates 
on cash sales (Tillotson, 1974, p. 131; Snape, 1926, pp. 139-143). 
3 These retirement contracts have also been described by Thane (2000, pp. 75-81), Jack (1912, pp. 177- 179) and 
Smith (1991).  
  3 
Institutions had a number of different demands on their established income, including building works, 
taxation from the Crown and the Papacy, their duty to look after pilgrims and the poor and also the 
possibility that the King may call on them and stay for a while, at their expense. They could have taken 
the easy way out of their cash flow problems and sold some of their substantial land holdings. However, 
the liquidation of real estate assets was frowned upon, and certainly not widespread practice. The sale of 
land, and even the alienation of property, was seldom undertaken as it was not regarded as good practice, 
or even in the long-term interests of the institution. Therefore this course of action would only be taken 
in  extreme  circumstances,  such  as  impending  bankruptcy.  Even  in  such  cases,  permission  for  land 
transactions had to be granted by the ruling authority of the religious order, and they were not keen to 
encourage these practices.
4 Harvey (1993, p. 120) shows how Westminster Abbey actively pursued a 
policy of expanding its landholding, and attempted to regain land that had previously been lost due to the 
“principle mistakes of their twelfth century predecessors”. 
 
It has been argued by historians that the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century was a time of great 
hardship for landowners following a series of famines affecting crop production, and murrain amongst 
livestock, leading to dispersal for some institutions that fell into bankruptcy (Campbell, 1991; Kershaw, 
1973b). Bell, Brooks and Dryburgh (2006) have shown that some Cistercian houses, such as Pipewell in 
Northamptonshire, tried to use forward contracts in wool to alleviate their cash-flow problems, while 
Jordan (1996, pp. 65-67) has demonstrated that other European houses relied on the sale or alienation of 
their real estate portfolios to avoid the fate of dispersal during this period of economic difficulty. The 
sale of corrodies fitted into this emerging pattern of such institutions finding increasingly sophisticated 
methods of generating ready cash to enable them to continue to function effectively. 
 
Section 2 summarises the view of modern researchers and medieval bishops that the sale of corrodies 
damaged the finances of institutions. Section 3 sets out a model for pricing annuities, and section 4 
considers  the  applicability  of  this  model  to  corrodies.  Section  5  discusses  some  difficulties  in 
determining whether corrodies were fairly priced, while section 6 contains an analysis of the effect of 
selling a corrody on the cash flows of the institution. Section 7 presents an empirical analysis of corrody 
pricing  based  on  two  separate  samples.  Finally,  section  8  has  the  conclusions  which  reconcile  the 
negative views of corrodies with the practice of overpricing. 
 
2  Contemporary and Historical Perceptions 
This paper focuses on corrodies purchased using either cash or land, and considers whether these sales 
were  financially  harmful  to  the  supplying  institution.  Much  of  the  previous  literature  on  purchased 
                                                 
4 Jordan (1996, p. 69) describes a couple of examples from religious institutions within the Holy Roman Empire.  
  4 
corrodies has questioned whether the institutions benefitted from selling corrodies, and most previous 
researchers have concluded that corrodies were financially damaging to institutions. Some examples of 
the  views  of  researchers  will  be  given,  followed  by  the  contemporary  views  of  medieval  bishops. 
Previous researchers did not conduct an economic analysis of corrodies, and appear to have based their 
negative  views  on  corrodies  being  sold  to  meet  immediate  cash  needs,  their  condemnation  by  the 
bishops, and the exposure to longevity risk.  
 
In his study of Bolton Priory, Kershaw (1973a, pp. 135-6) concludes that there was a clear positive 
connection between the sale of corrodies and financial difficulties for this institution; although he also 
estimates that between 1320-1325 the priory had to pay out approximately 6.5% of their total outgoings 
on servicing corrodians, which he describes as “a not unmanageable proportion''. Bottomley (2002, pp. 
114, 162) thinks that corrodians increased the financial problems of St Leonard’s Hospital York, while 
St Nicholas Richmond suffered financial problems from the imprudent grant of corrodies. At the friary 
at  Bishop’s  Lynn  and  at  Selby  the  sale  of  corrodies  drained  their  resources  and  undermined  their 
finances (Swanson, 1993, p. 236). The sale of corrodies also burdened St Albans (Moorman, 1945, p. 
271). 
 
Cullum (1991) states that the actuarial calculations of the masters of St Leonard’s Hospital York were 
inadequate, and the corrodians were more expensive to support than provided for in the initial charge. 
She concludes that the master of St Leonard’s Hospital York sold corrodies and liveries at a great rate, 
which burdened the hospital, and in 1399 it defaulted on some corrodies and liveries.
5 As corrodies were 
sold, an increasing proportion of the hospital’s income had to be spent on their servicing. This created a 
vicious circle in which more corrodies were sold to generate cash to service previous corrodies (Cullum, 
1991, pp. 6, 9. 28; Swanson, 1993, p. 237).  
 
More generally, Dyson et al (1969, p. 2) conclude that corrodies were a bad bargain for the monasteries, 
while Thompson (1947, p. 174) accepts that corrodies “corroded and gnawed on monastery finances”. 
He states that the sale of corrodies led to serious difficulties, was a financially unsound policy and 
proved a dead loss to the monasteries, providing no adequate return (Thompson, 1914, p. 229) and that 
the sale of corrodies “brought ...... debt and difficulty” to institutions (Thompson, 1921, p. 258). Hunt 
(1893, p. xxiii) thinks that sales of corrodies “may well have been prejudicial to the interests of the 
community, and when a convent was in pecuniary difficulties it is easy to believe that the monks must 
have sometimes made a bad bargain in order to relieve themselves of instant pressure”; and “the sale of 
corrodies was by no means to be commended”. Coulton (1936, p. 540) concludes that the evidence is 
                                                 
5 Liveries in this context were minor corrodies.  
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overwhelming against the view that some corrodies were good business bargains. Snape (1926, pp. 144-
5) reports frequent records of the burden placed on monasteries by the sale of corrodies. He concludes 
that, since German towns in the thirteenth century sold life annuities at a loss, it is hardly likely that the 
monks had any greater success selling corrodies. Harper (1983, p. 96) writes that “fifteenth century 
corrodies ... are regarded by modern historians as a grievously unsound policy.” He accepts that selling 
corrodies may have been a burden on monasteries, but argues that giving corrodies to faithful servants, 
the sick, and the poor and feeble was a sound and laudable practice. Kitchin (1892, p. 25) refers to 
corrodies as “this most unthrifty kind of loan”, whilst Baskerville (1937, p. 66) comments that “many 
abbeys were crippled financially by the reckless granting of corrodies”. 
 
These negative opinions on selling corrodies by academic researchers are similar to the contemporary 
judgements  of  medieval  bishops  who  consistently  condemned  and  criticised  the  sale  of  corrodies 
(Harper, 1983, p. 96; Keil, 1963-64, p. 115; Kershaw, 1973a, p. 135; Moorman, 1945, p. 271; Swanson, 
1993, p. 236; Thane, 2000, p. 83). In some cases the permission of the Bishop was required before a 
corrody could be granted (Little, 1958, p. 14; Snape, 1926, p. 145; Thompson, 1947, p. 175).
6 In 1442 
the Prior of Canons Ashby Priory informed the bishop that “the house has come to ruin by the sale of the 
corrody  and  of  the  copses”(Thompson,  1918,  p.  45).  At  St.  Frideswide’s  Priory  Oxford  the  bishop 
predicted that, as a result of their sale of corrodies, the priory would be “cast down into the well of 
destitution” (Thompson, 1918, p. 100). 
 
In 1385, after visiting Southwick Priory, William of Wykeham, Bishop of Winchester, informed the 
prior that abbeys and priories who have sold corrodies are “burdened with such sales and grants, the 
numbers unduly diminished of those for whose sustentation the said possessions have been specifically 
assigned by the founders thereof and by other faithful Christians, and those abbeys and priories are 
defrauded  of  their  due  services  and  have  suffered  grievous  evils  to  the  peril  of  the  [founders’  and 
benefactors’] souls and to the grievous prejudice and manifest scandal of the said abbeys and priories” 
(Coulton, 1936, p. 242). In about 1200 at Cirencester Abbey the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop 
of Worcester decided that “no other corrodies are to be sold, for sale savours of simony” (Cheney and 
John, 1986, p. 77). In 1268 the papal legate Ottobuono (subsequently Pope Adrian V) decreed that by 
                                                 
6 Reports of the visitations reveal a ban on the sale of corrodies without the express permission of the bishop of 
Lincoln at Bardney Abbey, St. Leonard’s Hospital Bedford, Brackley Hospital, Burnham Priory, Caldwell Priory, 
Canons  Ashby  Priory,  Croyland  Monastery,  Daventry  Priory,  Dorchester  Abbey,  Dunstable  Priory,  Elstow 
Monastery, Eynsham Monastery, Humberstone Abbey, Huntingdon Priory, Kyme Priory, Laund Priory, Leicester 
Abbey, Markby Priory, Missenden Monastery, St. Frideswide’s Priory Oxford, Peterborough Monastery, St. Neot’s 
Priory, Stonely Priory, Thornholm Priory, Thornton Monastery and Wellow Abbey (Thompson, 1914, 1918 and 
1929).  
  6 
selling corrodies “the churches are defrauded of due service, and the poor and sick are cheated of their 
sustenance”  and  those  who  sold  corrodies  would  be  excommunicated  (Coulton,  1936,  p.  245). 
Thompson (1928, p. 119) suggests that some of this episcopal censure was because selling corrodies 
resulted in lodgers who had nothing to do with the religious purpose of the institution. However, he goes 
on to conclude that the main reason for their condemnation was that corrodies were a financial burden, 
and led to financial weakness for institutions.  
 
Therefore, both historians and contemporary opinion have concluded that the selling of corrodies was 
not a financially profitable business for religious institutions. 
 
3  A Model for Pricing Corrodies 
Actuarial  pricing  formulae  will  now  be  used  to  investigate  whether  these  negative  conclusions  are 
justified. As discussed, corrodies were essentially life annuities. Therefore, the appropriate model for 
pricing  corrodies  is  that  for  pricing  single  premium,  inflation-proofed,  immediate,  life  annuities.  A 
simple pricing model which gives the actuarially fair price of an immediate, inflation-proofed annuity on 












+                     (1) 
where VxA is the current price of the annuity, i is the number of years since the annuity was purchased, r 
is the real rate of interest, A is the annual payment under the annuity (fixed in real terms), n is a number 
greater than the remaining years of life of the corrodian, and Pxi is the probability that an annuitant aged 
x when the annuity was purchased survives for at least i years. The real rather than the nominal interest 
rate is used as the discount rate because most of the benefits of a corrody were provided as goods and 
services, not cash, and so were expressed in real terms.
7 Models for pricing annuities or corrodies on the 
lives of a couple are more complicated.
8 
 
Corrodies are usually priced by historians in terms of “years purchase” i.e. (Price/Annual Payment), with 
no  adjustment  for  the  time  value  of  money  or  the  probability  of  survival.  Years  purchase  is  the 
                                                 
7 Equation (1) assumes the yield curve is flat, but in reality this may not be the case. If a single interest rate is used 
to discount the cash flows, this rate needs to be roughly  in the  middle between the highest and  lowest rates 
expected over the life of the corrody. 
8 Pricing annuities on joint lives involves some additional factors - the specified fraction of the initial annuity 
received by the survivor; whether it is a last survivor or a contingent survivor annuity (see section 8), and the 
degree of correlation between the life expectancy distributions of the two annuitants (Brown and Poterba, 2000).  
  7 
undiscounted payback period.
9 Some authors state the price of a corrody in terms of a rate of interest 
computed as the reciprocal of years purchase, expressed as a percentage.
10  
 
Sometimes perpetual corrodies (i.e. when the corrodian dies, the corrody passes to someone else, and so 
on)  were  sold,  and  a  simple  pricing  model  which  gives  the  actuarially  fair  price  of  an  immediate, 





=                     (2) 
where r is assumed constant over time. In this case survival probabilities are not required; nor is any 
information on age at purchase needed. For any life annuity or corrody, the value given by equation (1) 
cannot exceed that for the equivalent perpetuity given by equation (2); giving an upper bound on the 
price that should be charged for any non-perpetual corrody.  
 
4  Applicability of the Annuity Model to Corrodies 
This paper compares the actual prices  actually set by medieval institutions with the  actuarially fair 
prices. The applicability of the modern annuity pricing model in equation (1) to medieval corrodies will 
now be considered under three headings - the requisite theoretical knowledge, the required empirical 
knowledge, and the assumptions underlying the annuity pricing model. To the extent that institutions 
lacked the intuition to set corrody prices close to those given by equation (1), they may have tended to 
over or under price corrodies.  
 
Theoretical  Knowledge.  The  annuity  valuation  model  makes  use  of  the  concepts  of  probability  and 
discounting, which were unknown in medieval times. Therefore the suppliers of corrodies could not 
have conducted modern computations to set the price of a corrody. However, it is reasonable to expect 
that medieval institutions took some account of the time value of money and the probability of death 
when setting the price of corrodies, even though they had no knowledge of equation (1). 
 
Empirical Knowledge. A key input to equation (1) is the probability of survival for at least i years, and 
this requires a knowledge of mortality tables. We will now consider how mortality tables need to allow 
for adverse selection, and how the inputs to equation (1) are subject to estimation risk.  
  
                                                 
9 There is a substantial literature on the use of the payback period as an investment appraisal technique, which 
concludes that it is not a suitable method for measuring the attractiveness of an investment (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen, 2006, p. 90). 
10  For  example,  if  the  corrody  pays  £10  per  year  and  costs  £100,  its  years  purchase  is  100/10  =  10  years, 
corresponding to an interest rate of 10/100 = 10%.  
  8 
The  annuity  pricing  model  requires  access  to  accurate  mortality  tables  for  the  computation  of  the 
probability of survival to year i. The earliest recorded life annuities were sold by the Greek city state of 
Miletus in 205 BC, where the initial price was set at ten times the annual payment, without any access to 
a mortality table (Homer, 1977, pp. 37-38). The word annuity comes from the Latin annus, and the first 
age-related method for valuing annuities was used by the Romans. From 40 BC Romans were required 
to leave at least a quarter of their estate to their legal heir. If they had left life annuities (or the use of an 
asset for life) to others, these were valued using a method which relied on the age of the beneficiary in a 
very crude  way. In about 220 AD  Domitius Ulpianus proposed a superior method for valuing such 
annuities which relied on age in a more sophisticated manner (Greenwood, 1940; James, 1947, pp. 6-7; 
Mommsen, Krueger and Watson, 1985, 35:2:68; O’Donnell, 1936, pp. 109-112; Poitras, 2006, pp. 80-
81). In 1653 Lorenzo Tonti was the first person to publish a mortality table, but this is not thought to 
have  been  based  on  real  world  data  (Hald,  1990,  p.  120).  In  1662  John  Graunt  published  the  first 
mortality table based on actual data (for London) (Hald, 1990, p. 120; Daston, 1987, pp. 240-241). 




As the Roman example proves, even in the absence of data-based mortality tables, age can be allowed 
for when pricing annuities. It is common sense that young people tend to live longer than old people, and 
so some approximate adjustment (honed by experience) can be made to annuity and corrody prices. For 
example, annuity prices varied with age in Hanover in 1350, Augsburg in 1373 and Breslau in 1342-
1379 (Jack, 1912, p. 175). 
 
There is a tendency for those who subsequently have lives of above average length to buy annuities. This 
is probably due to their detailed knowledge of their own health and lifestyle and those of their close 
relatives.  Since  those  who  actually  buy  annuities  have  a  greater  life  expectancy  than  the  general 
population, the suppliers of annuities must increase  the price of their product to protect themselves 
against such adverse selection. This price increase makes annuities unattractive to the average person. In 
addition, it is possible another factor was at work to ensure that corrodians lived longer than average. 
Relative to the general population, monks were very well fed, clothed and sheltered; and had excellent 
sanitation, hygiene and medical care (Hatcher, 1986, p. 33). Since corrodians shared the life of monks, it 
is possible that this increased the life expectancy of corrodians, further increasing the adverse selection. 
                                                 
11 Shahar (1993) concludes that in medieval times the low life expectancy at birth was primarily due to high infant 
mortality, those who became adults had a good chance of surviving to be 60 or 70 years old, and old age did not set 
in until a person was aged 60 or 70. Retrospective studies of mortality in medieval times indicate that monks and 
peers had life expectancies which were not too different from those of modern times (Rosenthal, 1973; Hatcher, 
1986).  
  9 
While modern studies find monks and nuns have a substantially greater life expectancy than the general 
population, in medieval times Hatcher et al (2006, p. 683; also Flannelly et al, 2002) conclude that 
monks and nuns had a lower life expectancy than the population. This is attributed to their communal 
living, contact with dense urban communities, an unbalanced and excessively rich diet, and a lack of 
exercise. Poorer life expectancy may have reversed any adverse selection, reducing the fair price of a 
corrody. 
 
Adverse selection is facilitated by a lack of compulsion to buy an annuity, and by a small market for 
annuities, and both of these factors applied to corrodies. However, the residential nature of corrodies 
prevented the very young from becoming corrodians, and tended to attract the elderly. This limited 
adverse  selection,  although  Harvey  reports  that  some  corrodies  were  purchased  by  young  adults 
(Harvey, 1993, p. 208). The observation by Cullum  (1991, p. 25) that corrodies were priced at about ten 
years purchase is consistent with sensible age-independent pricing when substantial adverse selection by 
age is not important. While no researcher has produced evidence that the prices of corrodies varied with 
the age of the corrodian, there may well have been some crude adjustments to allow for differences in 
age. Such a study would require data on the age of corrodians when they entered into the deal, or their 
estimated life expectancy at the time of the transaction. Some corrodies were transferred or resold and 
this suggests that the identity (and age) of the corrodian was not of major concern to the supplying 
institution (Harvey, 1993, p. 187; Lewin, 2003, p. 41; Snape, 1926, p. 139; Thompson, 1928, p. 121; 
Tillotson, 1974, p. 133; Williams, 1983, p. 79; Wilson and Jones, 1917, p. 6 and p. 7).
12 
 
As well as longevity risk, institutions supplying corrodies also faced estimation risk - they did not know 
the value of the inputs to the annuity pricing model for certain, for instance the future cost of providing 
the  goods  and  services  required  under  the  corrody,  the  current  age  of  the  corrodian,  the  survival 
probabilities for someone of the corrodian’s age, and real interest rates in future years. This estimation 
risk should have led institutions to charge a higher price for their corrodies. 
 
Assumptions. The simple annuity pricing model in equation (1) makes a number of assumptions which 
may not have been met.
13 Equation (1) uses the time value of money to compute the present value of a 
corrody,  and  the  general  theoretical  validity  of  this  approach  requires  perfect  capital  markets 
                                                 
12 If a corrodian had the right to resell the corrody, this would have decreased its initial attractiveness to the selling 
institution, and increased its attractiveness to the purchaser. Such a corrody would be described in modern financial 
parlance as containing an embedded option.  
13 Friedman (1953, pp. 3-46) has argued that models should be judged by their ability to aid understanding and 
make predictions, and not by the validity of their assumptions.  
  10 
(Hirshleifer, 1958). This was not the case in medieval times, and it is debatable whether it is true now.
14 
In  the  absence  of  perfect  capital  markets  the  use  of  present  values  is  problematic  and  the  time 
preferences of the parties, which are unknown, become relevant.
15 The validity of this pricing model 
depends on the existence of competition in the corrody market, with rival suppliers of corrodies, such as 
other institutions selling corrodies, and the availability of close substitutes for corrodies, for instance 
retirement contracts.  While there  were rival suppliers and close substitutes, since each corrody  was 
unique, the degree of competition that existed is questionable.  
 
It is assumed that the real rate of interest (r) at which the supplier of the corrody invested the proceeds of 
the sale is known for the life of the corrody. Whether the riskless rate or some higher rate is used as the 
discount rate in equation (1) depends on the certainty with which the annuity or corrody payments will 
be made (Poterba, 2001, 568) and the  rate  at  which an institution can borrow is usually a suitable 
discount  rate.  The  certainty  with  which  the  payments  will  be  made  partly  depends  on  whether  the 
supplier can invest the sale proceeds in a way which hedges the risks inherent in the annuity or corrody.  
 
Selling  annuities  involves  the  risk  of  unexpected  changes  in  aggregate  longevity.  There  was  also 
exposure to unexpected changes in real interest rates, with no medieval financial instruments available 
for hedging this risk, nor for hedging longevity risk. Therefore, the institutions selling corrodies could 
not  hedge  all  the  risks  involved,  and  this  will  have  reduced  the  attractions  of  such  business  to 
institutions. The continued existence of the institution supplying the corrody was a vital consideration 
for potential corrodians as the corrodian was accepting the risk that the corrody would not be honoured 
(Cullum, 1991, p. 30). In some cases institutions sold a corrody, but then obtained the permission of the 
King to repudiate the corrody (Haren, 2000, p. 121; Wilson and Jones, 1917, p. 7; Wood-Legh, 1934, pp. 
27-8, p. 56). This possibility increased the risk of non-performance for corrodians, reducing the price 
they were prepared to pay for a corrody. 
 
The model assumes the average mortality experienced on the annuities or corrodies an institution has 
sold corresponds to the mortality table used in equation (1), which will only be true if a large sample of 
                                                 
14 For instance, the problems experienced by Northern Rock plc in September 2007 were due to its inability to 
borrow in the financial markets, despite being able to offer good collateral. 
15 If the monastery invests the proceeds to generate money to service the corrody and consumes any surplus or loss 
when the corrody ends, the lending rate is the appropriate discount rate. If the monastery uses the sale proceeds to 
pay off outstanding loans to the monastery and consumes the surplus or loss on the corrody now, the borrowing 
rate is appropriate. For other patterns of borrowing, lending and consumption, a mixture of borrowing and lending 
rates is required. If there are perfect capital markets and the borrowing and lending rates are the same, this potential 
complication disappears.  
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lives is involved. Therefore institutions needed to sell a substantial number of corrodies for the longevity 
risk  specific  to  each  individual  nominee  (the  person  on  whose  life  the  annuity  was  based)  to  be 
diversified away.
16 Since each institution had only a few purchased corrodies outstanding at any one 
time, the longevity risk specific to each corrodian was only partially diversified away. In consequence, 
the attractiveness of trading corrodies was greatly reduced as the institution did not diversify away all of 
the specific longevity risk. 
 
The annuity model does not incorporate any allowance for administrative costs, marketing expenses and 
risk aversion by the supplier. Brown and Warshawsky (2004, p. 337) suggest that allowance for these 
costs might add 3-5% to the price of a modern annuity. While medieval institutions did not market their 
corrodies,  they  must  have  incurred  costs  in  administering  corrodies.  Unlike  today’s  insurance 
companies, medieval institutions would not have had the benefit of substantial economies of scale from 
administering tens of thousands of corrodies. They also had to administer the daily supply of goods and 
services,  rather  than  a  monthly  money  transfer,  reducing  the  attractiveness  of  selling  corrodies.  In 
addition to the undiversified specific longevity risk mentioned above, the suppliers of corrodies also 
assumed cohort longevity risk.
17 Equation (1) assumes that any cohort-wide improvements in longevity 
have been correctly incorporated into the mortality tables. For example, longevity may have been on a 
long term upward trend, while a major plague or famine could substantially lower the average longevity 
of a particular cohort of corrodians. This risk would have further reduced the attractiveness of selling 
corrodies.  
 
Equation  (1)  also  assumes  that the  institution  receives  all  the proceeds  from  the  sale  of  a  corrody. 
However,  the  corrupt  master  of  an  institution  could  sell  corrodies  to  augment  his  own  stipend 
(Bottomley, 2002, p. 84). The prior of the Cathedral Church at Bath was alleged to have taken some of 
the money from the sale of a corrody for his own use (Lewin, 2003, p. 27) and three of the masters of St 
Leonard’s Hospital York were accused by the local community of stealing most of the money received 
from selling corrodies (Cullum, 1991, p. 27). Snape (1926, p. 144) reports that the abbot of St Albans 
received £1,077 from the sale of corrodies which he spent on himself, while the abbot of Peterborough 
Abbey was accused of giving the receipts from selling corrodies to his brother (Thompson, 1918, p. 
275). Corrupt masters may have sold corrodies at uneconomic prices because they anticipated personal 
                                                 
16 Specific longevity risk is the risk that the date of death of a particular corrodian differs from the average date of 
death for that age cohort of corrodians. 
17 For example, the risk that the average date of death for an age cohort of corrodians differs from that predicted by 
the mortality tables.  
  12 
gain.
18  The  rolls  of  parliament  of  1318  report  an  interesting  case  regarding  the  potential  for  the 
fraudulent exploitation of corrodies by a third party. In 1307 the Hospital of St Thomas of London was 
in the custody of the master and brethren of Ashridge College.
19 However, by 1315 the hospital had been 
surrendered after the college was accused of having 'alienated various tenements and burdened the house 
with corrodies and other things of that kind'.
20 The implication is that Ashridge College took the cash 
associated with the sales of the corrodies, and left the hospital with the problem of servicing these 
corrodies.  
 
Equation (1) assumes a single mortality table. Hatcher et al (2006, figure 4, p. 677) shows the crude 
death  rates  for  three  English  monasteries  over  the  period  1395-1529.  While  there  is  considerable 
variation from year to year, the moving average is remarkably stable at about 30 deaths per thousand, 
with no long term trend. Therefore, if the prices of corrodies were based on past experience, expected 
mortality would also have been fairly constant and not varied up and down with periodic outbreaks of 
disease.
21 Only four of the corrodies examined in this paper occurred before 1392, and so conclusions 
based on Hatcher et al are relevant to the vast majority of the sample corrodies. To the extent there were 
unexpected outbreaks of disease, actual profits from the sale of corrodies would have increased. 
 
The annuity pricing model assumes there are no non-pecuniary costs and benefits from the annuity, and 
the only relationship between supplier and purchaser is the cash flows (the initial price and annuity 
payments). This is clearly not the case for corrodies, as the corrodian usually lived in the institution. 
Therefore,  in  principle,  the  monetary  valuation  of  these  non-pecuniary  items  should  be  included  in 
equation (1). 
 
The non-pecuniary costs and benefits to the institution included extreme examples such as Lady Audely, 
a corrodian at Langley Priory, who took twelve dogs with her to church that created a disturbance that 
hindered the service (Thompson, 1918, p. 175). At Gracedieu Priory the Bishop received evidence that 
                                                 
18  A  sample  of  133  Benedictine  monasteries  had  an  average  life  of  463  years,  and  only 13%  closed  due  to 
mismanagement  (including  corruption).  Rost  et  al  (2008)  argue  this  is  due  to  their  very  robust  governance 
structure. So, although monastic corruption may have occurred from time to time, this was despite the strong 
system of monastic corporate governance, and probably did not lead to closure of the monastery. 
19 This refers to the college of Bonhommes at Ashridge, to which the current Ashridge Business School traces its 
origins, and is based on the same site. This was one of only two establishments of this order in England ('House of 
Bonhommes’, 2007, pp. 386-390). 
20 TNA SC 9/21 Edward II, October 1318, accessed using the Parliament Rolls of Medieval England CDROM. 
21 The first sample corrody after the Black Death in 1348 occurred in 1392. It seems likely that, in the 44 years 
since the Black Death, mortality expectations had normalized.  
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“a Frenchwoman who dwells in the priory should be removed because of the unseemliness of her life, 
for she receives all alike to her embraces” (Thompson, 1918, p. 122). While the institution could vet 
corrodians when a corrody was sold, subsequently it might be resold to someone whom the institution 
found objectionable. Little (1958, pp. 13-14) reports that some corrodians were required not to bring 
unsuitable guests into the institution. Some institutions imposed restrictions on a corrodian’s behaviour. 
For example, at Cleeve the Jopsons were forbidden from harassing the abbey’s rabbits (Williams, 1983, 
p. 87). Selling corrodies to couples introduced women into male institutions and vice versa, and in some 
cases corrodies were sold to single people of the opposite gender to that of the institution (Thompson, 
1929, p. 374). The selling of corrodies and the provisions that had to be made for supplying them with 
food and lodgings may have had the knock-on effect of the monastery having less food for the poor and 
having no space for novices (Harvey, 1993, pp. 191, 198; Lewin, 2003, p. 37), and on one occasion even 
introduced a Jewish corrodian into Dieulacres Abbey (Hibbert, 1910, p. 15). Finally, on a more positive 
note, selling corrodies may have helped the institution resist the imposition of additional corrodians 
nominated by the Crown, while Smith (1943, p. 52) suggests that the presence of corrodians “may well 
have served to lighten the monotony of the monastic routine”.  
 
5  Difficulties in Conducting an Analysis of the Profitability of Corrodies 
This section considers the choice of benchmark to decide whether corrodies were under or over priced, 
and then describes some difficulties in measuring profitability. In order to determine whether corrodies 
were under or over priced, it is necessary to specify some benchmark with which to compare the actual 
price. There are two dimensions of choice for such a benchmark: (a) the inclusion or exclusion of non-
pecuniary costs and benefits, and (b) the use of ex ante or ex post data. These will be considered in turn. 
 
Although  hard  to  measure,  non-pecuniary  costs  and  benefits  are  a  valid  part  of  the  profitability 
calculation, and economists generally argue that such costs should be included, although valuing them 
can be very difficult, and modern accounts exclude non-pecuniary costs and benefits. The claim that 
corrodies were a financial burden on institutions takes no account of non-pecuniary costs and benefits, 
and so they are not considered in the empirical analysis below. 
 
Due to a lack of diversification across many corrodies, substantial longevity risk remained for the few 
corrodies held at an institution, and the outcome may have been a large profit or loss. On average, about 
half of corrodians will have died after the date given by mortality tables (if they had been available). 
This leads to two different, but related questions that can be asked about financial profitability:- (a) were 
the prices ex ante sensible, and (b) were they ex post profitable. All that can be expected of institutions is 
that they set prices which were sensible ex ante, accepting that in many cases, the actual out-turn was a 
loss.  An  ex  ante  benchmark  is  used  in  the  empirical  analysis  below.  However,  following  modern  
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accounts, profitability is often thought of as an ex post concept. If institutions decided to sell corrodies 
this could easily result in a loss and they were, as Thompson (1947, p. 174) pointed out, gambling on 
longevity.  Modern  insurance  companies  that  sell  annuities  have  to  meet  statutory  capital  reserve 
requirements, and a prudent medieval institution that sold corrodies should have held sufficient capital 
reserves to support such a risky business. Some of the financial difficulties experienced by institutions 
may be explicable as normal business risks, coupled with inadequate capital reserves.  
 
Once the benchmark has been defined, there are a range of difficulties for those seeking to measure 
whether corrodies were fairly priced; making the ex ante (or ex post) profitability of medieval corrodies 
very  hard  to  ascertain.  Corrodies  were  individually negotiated,  and  so  the  price  and the  goods  and 
services supplied were often different in each case,  as was the life  expectancy of the individual or 
couple. Therefore a profitability analysis needs to be conducted for each corrody, and the conclusion 
from one corrody need not apply to another.  
 
The initial life expectancy (or even the age) of corrodians required for computing ex ante profitability is 
usually unknown, and Keil (1963-64, p. 113) concludes that there is not enough information available on 
the longevity of corrodians to determine profitability. Snape (1926, pp. 143-4) concluded that there is an 
absence of data on the success or otherwise of the monastic officials in estimating life expectancy, that is 
expected life against actual life. When computing ex post profitability, there is little information on the 
actual longevity of corrodians. One exception is a sample of 66 corrodies at St Leonard’s Hospital York 
for which Cullum (1991, p. 26) calculated that the average period to death for corrodians from the time 
the corrody commenced was at least 8.7 years (men 8.1 years and women 10.7 years); and that the 
average period until death for nine of these corrodians was 11.4 years.  
   
Since there is usually  a time lag of  many years between the sale of a corrody and its completion, 
working out the ex post financial profitability of a particular corrody requires long term record keeping. 
The  supplying  institutions  did  not  account  separately  for  corrodies,  and  so  there  is  little 
contemporaneous data available on ex post profitability. 
 
Institutions  may  have  deliberately  subsidized  corrodies  by  selling  them  at  below  cost  to  deserving 
individuals as an act of charity (Knowles, 1961, p. 266). In this case the corrody may be underpriced, but 
as  the  result  of  a  deliberate  policy  by  the  institution  to  donate  this  amount  to  the  corrodian.  For 
Westminster Abbey, Harvey (1993, pp. 200, 204) has pointed out that most corrodians were previously  
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known to the abbey.
22 In such cases the price of the corrody may have been affected (up or down) by 
these personal relationships. Williams (1983, p. 84) also mentions that corrodians appear to have had 
local connections. 
 
Finally, there is a need to value the goods and services supplied to the corrodian, and this is not always 
straightforward; for instance the use of a garden. Where the corrody was purchased with land, Keil 
(1963-64, p. 113) argues that there is not enough information available on the value of the property 
transferred for accurate profitability calculations. Some corrodians agreed that, on death, they would 
leave all their assets to the institution, and this promise is hard to value when the corrody is initiated 
(Coulton, 1936, p. 663; Little, 1958, p. 10, Williams, 1983, p. 87). Some corrodians agreed to pay for the 
construction of the building where they lived, which passed to the institution on their death; while in 
other cases the institution put up a building for them to live in, and there may be problems valuing these 
buildings (Little, 1958, pp. 14-15).  
 
6  Cash Flow Analysis 
Institutions sometimes needed cash to cope with financial difficulties, for instance to cover short term 
liquidity problems, repay a loan, or invest in new building projects. Keil (1963-64, p. 114) reports that 
the sale of corrodies was used to repay loans, and Little (1958, pp. 14-15) and Lewin (2003, p. 37) state 
that the sale of corrodies was used to raise money for the construction of buildings, and for other forms 
of capital investment. Therefore the sale of corrodies could help an institution by offering a way round 
capital market imperfections, and this benefit may be overlooked when considering their profitability. 
 
The time profile of the cash flows for an institution selling a corrody for cash appears in figure 1, and 
shows a large cash injection at time 0 (i.e. OP), followed by a small cash outflow in subsequent years 
(i.e. OC) until year T; where T is the date of death of the nominee, and so is uncertain when the corrody 
is sold. After the large inflow in the initial year, the corrody was just a drain on the financial resources of 
the institution, and so is likely to have been seen as a burden by the institution.  
 
This pattern of cash flows also exposed the institution to a number of problems. Harvey (1993, p. 180) 
and Lewin (2003, p. 37) point out that selling corrodies for cash could tempt the monks to live beyond 
their means, as the money is received now, while the obligations are in the future. Squandering the 
proceeds of the sale may have induced financial problems for the institution. A large cash flow also 
created the potential for some or all of the sale proceeds to be stolen by a corrupt church official. 
                                                 
22 For instance acting as their school master, employed as a mason by the abbey, a draper who supplied clothing to 
the abbey, a valet in charge of the abbey’s refectory, or people who occupied houses in the locality of the abbey.  
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7  Empirical Analysis 
Although age and life expectancy data is not available, it is possible to investigate the extent to which 
corrodies were priced using an ex ante benchmark in accordance with equation (1).
23 This will be done 
using data for two samples: single and joint life corrodies.  As  with all medieval research, the data 
available  for  conducting  this  empirical  analysis  have  limitations.  The  survival  of  information  on 
corrodies is not uniform between institutions, and corrodies purchased by a transfer of real estate are not 
included in the empirical analysis due to difficulties in pricing the land or buildings transferred.
24 For the 
remaining corrodies, even when a purchase is acknowledged, the amount paid by the corrodian, or the 
annual value of the corrody, are not always detailed. For the corrodies examined below, the cash value 
of the annual benefits in kind is available because these institutions were subject to an episcopal audit 
sometime during the life of the corrody. For instance, the audit of St Leonards Hospital, York occurred 
in 1399, and reported on corrodies sold between 1392-99 which were between three and seven years old. 
Since inflation was near zero (Clark, 2004, appendix table 4) the cash value of the corrody at its start 
would have been little different from the audit valuation. 
 
The two samples used in this paper represent all the available English observations where the price of 
the corrody and value of the  annual benefits  were recorded.  Therefore the results cover the known 
English population of such corrodies, and so provide definitive results for this type of corrody. The 
question is the extent to which these corrodies are representative of corrodies more generally?  
 
No figures are available on the distribution of corrodies by type or year granted. In order to provide 
some information on these questions, the survey of corrodians at Westminster Abbey between 1100-
1540 provided by Harvey (1993, pp. 239-251) was analysed. Her survey details 69 different corrody 
transactions for 86 individuals (i.e. single corrodians and married couples). 36 corrodies were granted to 
individuals (41%), either from a request by the King or for other services to the Abbey; 20 individuals 
(23%) purchased a corrody for a specified cash sum, while a further 11 (13%) purchased a corrody for 
an unspecified sum, or as part of a loan deal. Finally, 20 corrodies (23%) were granted in exchange for 
real estate. Therefore, 58% of corrodies were sold, and 61% of these corrodies were paid for in cash, 
                                                 
23 The claim is that corrodies were a financial burden on institutions, irrespective of any non-pecuniary costs and 
benefits. Therefore non-pecuniary costs and benefits will not be considered in the empirical analysis. 
24 It is assumed there is no systematic link between the profitability of corrodies and the method of payment of the 
purchase price. 
Figure 1. Cash Flows When a Corrody is Paid 
for with Cash  
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suggesting that corrodies purchased for cash formed the bulk of the business. 
 
Our sample spans the years 1316 - c. 1460, covering a period of around 150 years. Although a long 
period to investigate, it allows us to discount any particular event such as plague or famine that may 
have led to monasteries looking to sell corrodies. In order to test the representativeness of our sample, 
the chronological distribution of the corrodies analysed in this paper was compared with that for the 
corrodies considered by Harvey (1993, pp. 239-251). The frequencies shown by the Harvey survey, 
followed by those for this paper’s two samples are: pre 1310 - 30% and 0%; 1311-1399 - 44% and 69%; 
1400-1460 - 22% and 31%; post 1460 - 4% and 0%. There are some clear differences between the two 
frequency distributions, with a much higher frequency for the pre-1310 period in Harvey’s sample, and a 
bunching  of  the  data  used  for  this  paper  around  1390-1400.  The  conclusions  reached  below  are 
conditional on the representativeness of the sample data analysed in this paper, but there is no reason to 
believe it is not broadly representative of corrody pricing in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
 
The 27 individual and 24 joint life corrodies analysed below are drawn from eight religious institutions, 
including one hospital, one priory and six abbeys. We have been able to utilise one original source from 
The National Archives for the majority of the data (30 of the 51 records). This is from a visitation made 
in 1399 to St Leonards Hospital, York.
25 We have also mined the records of the Visitations in Lincoln, 
compiled by Thompson, and taken the remaining data from a detailed search of other secondary sources. 
The  nature  and  financial  state  of  the  institutions  selling  corrodies  are  not  discussed  because  it  is 
irrelevant to appraising whether they were setting actuarially fair prices. 
 
To compute the corrody prices given by equation (1) it is necessary to use an expected real interest rate 
for the life of the corrody that reflects the credit status of the institution, for example the rate at which 
the institution could borrow  money.  Despite the ban on usury, during the  middle ages interest was 
charged on loans, both explicitly and implicitly. Cross sectional interest rates vary  with credit risk, 
maturity, liquidity and any special conditions attached to the loan, while the general level of real interest 
rates varies over time with economic conditions. With imperfect competition, interest rates may also 
vary from lender to lender.
26 
 
Clark used rent charges to estimate nominal riskless interest rates and land rents to estimate real riskless 
interest  rates  for  50  year  periods.  These  agreements  were  very  low  risk,  making  the  implied  rates 
                                                 
25 TNA C 270/21. This source is discussed in Cullum, (1991). 
26 For discussion of medieval interest rates and some long standing misconceptions, see Bell, Brooks and Moore 
(2009).  
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effectively risk free rates. Clark (2004, appendix table 4) also constructed an index of the prices of 26 
farm outputs, and this was used to convert the nominal rates for rent changes to real interest rates. This 
gives 117 real riskless interest rate observations for the period 1251-1600.
27 However, most of these 
observations  are  for  the  first  and  last  50  year  periods,  with  fewer  observations  for  the  intervening 
periods. Since real interest rates followed a downward trend during this period, weighted least squares 
was used to fit a time series regression to estimate the real riskless interest rate for each 50 year period. 
This gives the following real riskless interest rates: 1301-1350 - 8.6%, 1351-1400 - 7.8%, 1401-1450 - 
6.9%, 1451-1500 - 6.0%. 
 
To  estimate  the  real  interest  rate  charged  on  loans  to  institutions,  allowance  must  be  made  for  the 
institution’s credit risk and the liquidity of the loan. Monasteries would very probably have spent the 
receipts from corrodies on buildings, buying (or repurchasing) land, repaying loans, and paying taxes to 
the pope and king. So the risky interest rate at which monasteries could borrow is the most appropriate 
discount rate. Therefore the rates charged on risky loans are relevant, as they give a more direct estimate 
of the cost of capital to institutions. Interest rates on risky loans suggest the presence of a substantial risk 
premium  for  medieval  monasteries.  In  their  study  of  the  medieval  wool  trade,  Bell,  Brooks  and 
Dryburgh (2007) demonstrated that the nominal annual interest rates implicit in 22 forward contracts 
entered  into  by  monasteries  from  1259-1292  averaged  between  18%  and  22%.
28  Since  the  annual 
inflation during this period was  0.31% (Clark, 2004, appendix table 4) the average real risky rate was 
about (20% + 0.3%) = 20.3%, giving a risk premium of about 10%, relative to the real riskless rate of 
9.5% for the 1251-1300 period. Little other authoritative evidence is available on the monastic risk 
premium.  
 
The current risk premium required for investing in UK equities, rather than government debt, is around 
4% per year, and has been reasonably stable over the past century or more.
29 To be cautious, rather than 
10%,  a  risk  premium  of  only  4%  will  be  used.  Understating  the  risk  premium  reduces  computed 
monastic profits from selling corrodies. The regression equation estimated above was used compute the 
riskless real interest rate applicable to each year.
30 A risk premium of 4% was then added to give the 
                                                 
27 Clark (2007), pp. 174-175, found little regional variation in riskless nominal interest rates across England. 
28 Eldridge and Maltby (1992) found that wool sales by Fountains Abbey had implied interest rates of between 
40% and 59% per year. However, these figures were corrected by Bell, Brooks and Dryburgh (2007, p. 377), to 
17% and 22%. While implicit interest rates include transactions costs incurred by the lender, these were low for 
long term forward contracts. 
29 See, for example, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) 
30  r = 10.3187 0.8679T, where T = 1, ... 7.  
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risky rate applicable to the particular year when each corrody was sold. Therefore the interest rate used 
below  in  computing  the  real  rate  of  institutional  profit  varied  from  year  to  year.  Since  definitive 
information  on  real  interest  rates  for  institutions  in  the  middle  ages  is  not  available,  the  pricing 
calculations in tables 2 and 4 use real interest rates of 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. These real rates have 
been chosen to span the range of likely risky interest rates. The significance tests below use the interest 
rate specific to the half century in which the corrody was sold. 
 
Single Lives. The data for corrodies on a single life, where the goods and services received by the 
corrodian were valued by the institution at the time of the agreement, are set out in table 1. The data in 
this table will be analysed in three different ways; each dealing with the lack of life expectancy data 
using an alternative methodology – (a) immortal corrodians, (b) the life expectancy implied by the price, 
and (c) the internal rate of return (IRR) using an assumed life expectancy. 
 
The first method (immortal corrodians) of analysing the data in table 1 is to look for corrodies whose 
price was above that for the corresponding perpetuity (Vp in equation 2). Since none of these corrodies 
were perpetuities, the price of the perpetuity gives an upper bound for corrodies priced using equation 
(1), and any corrodies priced above this level were overpriced, relative to equation (1). Where the price 
of a corrody breached this upper bound, the size of the excess is given in bold in table 2. For example, 
corrody  4  (unnamed  of  Westminster  Abbey)  breached  this  upper  bound  for  all  the  interest  rates 
considered. If interest rates  were 5% per year and this corrodian lived forever,  Westminster  Abbey 
would make a profit of £43 6s 8d, while the unnamed corrodian would have made a corresponding loss. 
Of the 27 corrodies on a single life considered in table 2, 24 breach this upper bound when the interest 
rate is assumed to be 20%, while nine breach or hit it with a 10% interest rate. This suggests that, at least 
for the sample of corrodies considered, there was substantial overpricing if real interest rates were about 
10% or higher, since the lowest of the estimated risk-adjusted real interest rates for the entire data period 
is 10.0%. For cases where the perpetuity upper bound is not binding, there is no indication of whether 
corrodies were fairly priced; and this will now be considered. 
 
The second approach to analysing the data in table 1 is to compute the implied life expectancy (ILE) by 









+                     (3) 
where Va is the actual price of the corrody. The implied life expectancy gives the expected years of life 
the institution was using when setting the price of the corrody, given that the institution was pricing  
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corrodies  according  to  equation  (1).
31  In  effect,  the  implied  life  expectancy  is  the  break  even  life 
expectancy. If the corrodian dies before reaching their implied life expectancy the institution makes 
money, while if the corrodian lives for a longer period he or she makes a profit. When the discount rate 
is zero the implied life expectancy equals both the expected years of life and the years purchase (or 
undiscounted payback period). The values of implied life expectancy are shown in table 2, which also 
shows the years purchase (or implied life expectancy for a zero discount rate, or undiscounted payback 
period). For example, if the real interest rate was zero and Robert de Bentley (corrodian no. 1) died 
within 7.28 years, Bolton Abbey would have made a profit, and Robert would have made a loss. If the 
interest rate was 5%, then Bolton Abbey would have made a profit and Robert a loss if he died within 
9.26 years. Finally, if the real interest rate was 15% or higher, Bolton Abbey would have made a profit, 
and Robert a loss, even if Robert lived forever. 
 
For  single  lives,  the  average  implied  life  expectancy  for  a  real  interest  rate  of  10%  is  23.5  years 
(assuming a life expectancy of 40 years for corrodians whose corrody is profitable when they have an 
infinite life). This number understates the true implied life expectancy due to the effects of discounting 
and, allowing for this understatement, these corrodians may have had an implied life expectancy of 
something like 25 years. Comparing this with the estimate of average corrodian life expectancy of 11.4 
years by Cullum (1991, p. 26) leads to the conclusion that, for real interest rates of 10% and above, 
corrodies on single lives were substantially overpriced. 
 
The final way of analysing the profitability of corrodies is to assume a life expectancy (11.4 years),
32 and 
compute the IRR of the resulting cash flows (
1  Brealey,  Myers  and  Allen  (2006,  pp.  91-93). Since the 
implied life expectancy is less than the true expected years of life, setting the implied life expectancy 
equal to 11.4 implies a longer true life expectancy, for instance 12 to 13 years. These IRRs appear in the 
rightmost  column  of  table  2.  When  someone  buys  a  corrody  they  are  effectively  surrendering  the 
purchase price now, in exchange for a sequence of annual cash flows. The IRR of a corrody gives the 
rate of return received by the corrodian on their ‘investment’ in the corrody, in other words the rate of 
return on the capital that remains tied up in the investment. The institution may use the purchase price to 
repay loans or make capital investments, and the institution receives a return on the purchase price equal 
to its borrowing rate, while the cost of the corrody is its IRR. The bigger is the spread between the IRR 
and the institution’s borrowing rate, the higher is the institution’s profit on the corrody. The average IRR 
in table 2 is 6.8%, with considerable variation between corrodies from a high of 29.5% to a low of 
                                                 
31 The implied life expectancy is actually a bit less than the expected years of life due to the effects of discounting 
(Alter and Riley (1986), p. 12). 
32 Following Cullum (1991), p. 26.  
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 12.3%. This dispersion may be due to deviations in the life expectancy of the corrodian from  the 
assumed average of 11.4 years. 
 
If  real  interest  rates  were  10.0%  (the  lowest  estimated  risk  adjusted  rate),  since  corrodies  yielded 
corrodians an average real return of 6.8%, institutions made an average profit of 3.2%. Using the real 
interest rates applicable to each year, the average institutional real rate of profit was 4.8%. On this basis, 
there was plenty of scope for covering any non-pecuniary costs less benefits, administration costs and 
adverse selection costs from supplying a corrody. 
 
Joint Lives. As well as data on single life corrodies, it is also possible to analyse the available data on a 
separate sample of joint life corrodies. The equivalent of equation (1) is more complicated for joint life 
annuities. There are two main types of joint life annuity - (a) 100% payout while both nominees are still 
alive, and y% to the last survivor; or (b) 100% while the primary nominee is alive, and y% when only the 
secondary nominee is alive, with a different pricing model applying in each case (Brown and Poterba 
(2000). Williams (1983, p. 79) reports that both types of joint life corrody existed. The data on 24 joint 
life corrodies appears in table 3, while the results for the first way of analyzing the data showing the 
profit (in bold) made by the institution, assuming both corrodians lived forever, appear in table 4. For 
real interest rates of 15% and 20%, all but one of these corrodies was profitable if the corrodian lived 
forever, while for real interest rates of 10%, half were profitable with immortal corrodians. 
 
For  joint  life  annuities,  the  concept  of  an  implied  life  expectancy  is  problematic  as  two  lives  are 
involved. Equation (3) can be used to compute an implied life expectancy for joint life annuities, but 
interpreting this number is more difficult. The implied life expectancy for a joint life annuity is the 
weighted average life expectancy of the husband and wife, where the weights are based on the values of 
the full annuity and the survivor annuity. Table 4 contains the implied life expectancies for the joint life 
corrodies.  The right hand column of table 4  contains the IRRs of the cash flows for each corrody, 
assuming a weighted average life expectancy of 13 years. The implied life expectancy used for joint 
lives has been increased from 11.4 years because, in the absence of perfect correlation, the joint life 
expectancy  (where  the  two  life  expectancies  are  weighted  by  the  values  of  the  joint  and  survivor 
annuities) is almost certainly longer than the single life expectancy (Jagger and Sutton, 1991; Spreeuw 
and Wang, 2008; Parkes, Benjamin and Fitzgerald, 1969). 
 
When the real interest rate is 10%, the average implied life expectancy for joint life corrodies is 31.9 
years (assuming a joint life expectancy, allowing for the lower benefits received by the survivor, of 40 
years when a perpetuity is profitable). This indicates that joint life corrodies were also substantially 
overpriced.   
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The average IRR for corrodies on joint lives is 3.4%; indicating that joint life corrodies were more 
profitable for institutions than single life corrodies. For real interest rates of 10.0%, institutions stood to 
make  an  average  profit  of  6.6%.  Using  the  real  interest  rates  applicable  to  each  half  century,  the 
institutional rate of profit was 8.2%. 
 
Significance Tests. The institutional rate of profit on each corrody (the real risky interest rate applicable 
for the year when the corrody was sold minus the IRR on the corrody), will now be used to investigate 
whether  the  average  institutional  excess  real  return  is  significantly  positive,  as  suggested  above;  or 
whether the average excess real return was zero or negative, as claimed by historians and medieval 
bishops. There is probably a positive correlation between longevity and corrody prices, resulting in an 
increase  in  the  standard  deviations  of  the  IRRs  computed  using  a  common  life  expectancy,  which 
decreases the chances of a statistically significant result.  
 
Before proceeding to apply t tests, which assume normality, the distributions of single and joint life 
institutional returns were examined to see if normality can be rejected. The Jarque-Bera test statistics are 
5.48 for single lives and 8.81 for joint lives. For single lives, normality cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance  level,  indicating  that  the  sample  data  appears  to  be  normally  distributed.  Normality  is 
rejected for the joint lives due to the inclusion of the corrody for William and Mary Kewe which has the 
exceptionally high IRR of 18.2%. If this observation is removed, the Jacques-Bera statistic drops to only 
0.54,  which  is  consistent  with  normality  at  the  1%  significance  level.  Therefore  this  observation  is 
dropped for the significance tests, leaving 23 observations with a normal distribution. 
 
The mean real return to institutions is 4.8% on single life corrodies, and 8.9% for joint lives, while the 
standard deviations (s) are 8.96% for single lives and 3.36% for joint lives. A one tailed t test was used 
to examine the hypothesis that the average institutional excess real return (z)  was zero or negative, 
against the alternative hypothesis that the return was positive. For single life corrodies the t value is t = 
[z  n]/s = [4.8 5.196]/8.96 = 2.78. The null hypothesis of a zero or negative real return is rejected at 
well above the 1% level of significance, and the alternative hypothesis that the average institutional 
excess real return on single life corrodies was positive is accepted. Similarly for joint life corrodies the t 
test is t = [8.9 4.796]/3.36 =12.70, which is significantly positive at a very high level of significance; 
confirming the alternative hypothesis that institutional excess real returns on joint life corrodies were 
positive.
33 Both of these results support the view that corrodies were overpriced. 
                                                 
33  For  the  full  sample  of  24  observations,  the  t  value  is  8.71.  Instead  of  deleting  the  third  observation, 
bootstrapping was used to test the significance of the sample of 24 joint lives.10,000 samples with 24 observations 
each were drawn with replacement. The distribution of the 10,000 sample means was computed to give a 99%  
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8  Conclusions 
This paper has described how medieval bishops took a negative view of selling corrodies; a view which 
has been repeated by historians. These two groups condemned the sale of corrodies because they were 
thought to be financially damaging to institutions, and because they subverted the religious purpose of 
the  institutions.  However,  the  institutions  themselves  continued  to  sell  corrodies,  despite  episcopal 
criticism; suggesting that the institutions expected to derive a benefit from selling corrodies.  
 
The data available for investigating the profitability of corrodies, although limited and imperfect, has not 
previously been investigated using actuarial techniques. It is argued that, while medieval institutions 
were not formally capable of applying annuity pricing models, they may have been able to set prices 
broadly in line with such models. After considering the difficulties of measuring the profitability of 
corrodies, an annuity pricing model was used to investigate the implied life expectancies of single and 
joint life corrody prices, and the IRR for a specified life expectancy. In contradiction of the established 
view that corrodies were underpriced, it was found that many corrodies were profitable. This conclusion 
was supported by showing that institutional real rates of return on both single and joint life corrodies 
were significantly positive.  
 
If, as the empirical analysis suggests, the sale of corrodies was usually financially profitable, why was it 
universally condemned by medieval bishops? A simple explanation is that after the first year, corrodies 
sold for cash were a pure financial burden on the institution until the corrodian died, and those sold for 
land showed no net financial benefit to the institution until well after the corrodian died. 
 
At any one time most institutions had only a few corrodians who had purchased their corrody. Therefore, 
even if the corrodies had been sold at an actuarially fair price, some of the corrodies would show an ex 
post financial loss. In some cases such losses would have been substantial due to the corrodian surviving 
for many years beyond their expected terminal age. By selling corrodies in small numbers and foregoing 
the benefits of diversifying away the specific longevity risk, institutions exposed themselves to a “white 
knuckle ride” of profit and loss, depending on their particular longevity experience; probably without the 
requisite  capital  reserves  to  absorb  the  financial  losses.
34  In  addition,  there  may  have  been  some 
confusion  between  the  financial  effects  of  corrodies  that  had  been  sold,  and  the  effects  of  other 
corrodies, for instance royal corrodies; which were a pure financial burden.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
lower confidence interval of 8.11%, confirming that the sample mean of 8.2% is very significantly positive. 
34 One way for institutions to reduce their longevity risk would have been to substantially increase the number of 
corrodies they sold, thereby diversifying the longevity risk. In this scenario, institutions would effectively have 
been running old people’s homes with an initial flat (non-refundable) fee, rather than monthly or annual fees.  
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When assessing the profitability of corrodies, medieval bishops may have underestimated the effects of 
the high real interest rates at which institutions could borrow in reducing the present cost of providing 
future goods and services. Even if the institution supplying the corrody was in financial difficulties, this 
need not have been caused by the sale of corrodies. Many other factors affected the overall financial 
position of institutions, and without controlling for these other factors, any financial problems cannot be 
attributed to the sale of corrodies. For example, Kershaw (1969, p. 329) reports that Bolton priory sold 
corrodies when they were in financial difficulties, and the sale of corrodies may have been a symptom of 
financial difficulties, not their cause. 
 
There  was  also  an  absence  of  data  on  which  to  base  authoritative  ex  ante  or  ex  post  profitability 
computations, which just left impressions; distorted by the above effects. Medieval bishops may have 
disapproved of selling corrodies for non-financial reasons. For example, the bad behaviour of some 
corrodians, bringing women into male institutions (and vice versa) and the presence of lodgers who had 
nothing to  do  with  the  religious  purpose  of  the  institution.  Finally,  the  sale  of  corrodies  may  have 
diverted resources from the sick and poor to feed corrodians, and reduced the recruitment of novices to 
free up resources to service corrodians. Of course, this only applies if corrodies were unprofitable, and 
could have had the opposite effect if they were profitable. 
 
Despite episcopal condemnation, institutions continued to sell corrodies. It has been demonstrated that, 
for the two samples of corrodies analysed in this paper, prices were set so that in ex ante terms corrodies 
offered substantial profits; although ex post some corrodies lost money. Selling corrodies for cash gave 
an immediate inflow of money, while the cash outflows were spread out into the distant future. This 
ready source of cash was a welcome addition to the institutional finances. It is perhaps unfortunate that 
the  sale  of  corrodies  provided  a  tempting  opportunity  for  officials  to  divert  this  cash  for  corrupt 
purposes.  
 
There has been no previous detailed analysis of the profitability of corrodies, probably because of the 
absence of life expectancy data; and academic researchers may have accepted the condemnatory views 
of  the  medieval  bishops.  By  using  actuarial  techniques,  this  paper  has  demonstrated  that  medieval 
institutions, on average, appear to have made sensible pricing decisions when selling corrodies; which 
appear to have been over, rather than under priced.
35 That they may not have invested the cash wisely, or 
indeed squandered it, does not detract from the apparent profitability of this business for institutions. 
 
                                                 
35 While the sale of corrodies may have generated financial gains for institutions, it is possible, but unlikely, that 
the non-pecuniary costs of corrodians to institutions outweighed the non-pecuniary benefits by a margin sufficient 
to eliminate the financial gains.   
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Finally, if corrodies were over priced by institutions, why were individuals willing to pay inflated prices 
to retire in a religious institution? One possible explanation is that the non-pecuniary benefits received 
by corrodians were highly valued by them. These may have included the monks praying for corrodians 
and their parents (Harvey, 1993, p. 195; Little, 1958, p. 11; Williams, 1983, p. 87); the provision of 
social and health care, and relieving a corrodian of the burden of managing his estates (Moorman, 1945, 
p. 271). The weak bargaining position of potential corrodians, coupled with insufficient competition 
between institutions then failed to remove the resulting excess institutional profits. Future research could 
be directed to discovering whether this is a realistic explanation.  
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 Figure 1: Real Cash Flows When a Corrody is Paid For with Cash 
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1  Robert de Bentley  1316-17  £80 1s 0d  £11 0s 0d 
2  Adam Propheet  1317-18  £53 6s 8d   £4 0s 0d  Bolton Abbey
1 
3  Man of Lonesdale  1318-19  £40 0s 0d   £4 0s 0d 
Westminster Abbey
2  4  Unnamed  c1400  £150 0s 0d   £5 6s 8d 
5  John Pykeworth  1418  £40 0s 0d  £8 7s 11d 
Westminster Abbey
3 
6  John Malton  c1442  £80 0s 0d  £8 7s 11d 
7  John Hardene  c1432  £6 13s 4d  £2 0s 0d 
8  Wyldebore  c1440  £66 13s 4d  £6 13s 4d 
9  William Puncharde  c1440  £10 0s 0d  £1 13s 4d 
10  John Hoise  c1440  £20 0s 0d  £2 13s 4d 
11  Robert Howet  c1440  £20 0s 0d  £2 13s 4d 
12  Robert Howet  c1440   £5 6s 8d  £1 13s 4d 
Humberstone Abbey
4 
13  Richard Bekeryng  c1440  £13 6s 8d  £2 6s 6d 
Laund Priory
5  14  3 unnamed corrodies  c1336  £58 6s 8d  £11 6s 8d 
Peterborough Abbey
6  15  Thomas Mortymer  c1437  £300 0s 0d  £20 0s 0d 
Thornholm Abbey
7  16  Edward   c1440  £20 0s 0d  £2 0s 0d 
17  Marjorie de Botheby  1392  £26 13s 4d  £3 18s 6d 
18  Robert Brockett  1393  £26 13s 4d  £2 11s 0d 
19  John Wartyre  1393  £30  0s 0d  £3 17s 10d 
20  Katrina Andrewe  1393  £46 13s 4d  £4  9s 8d 
21  Thomas Clerk  1393  £66 13s 4d  £8 0s 0d 
St Leonards Hospital, 
York
8 
22  William Selare   1394  £56 13s 4d  £5 18s 0d 
                                                 
1 Kershaw (1969), table 41. 
2 Cook (1961), p. 21. 
3 Harvey (1993), pp. 248-249. 
4 Thompson (1918), p. 141. 
5 Thompson (1918), p. 178. 
6 Thompson (1929), p. 274. 
7 Thompson (1929), p. 364. 
8 TNA C 270/21  
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23  Nicholas Buteler  1395  £53 6s 8d  £6 5s 0d 
24  John Fishewyk  1396  £40 0s 0d  £4 10s 0d 
25  Sir William de Neuton  1396  £40 0s 0d  £5 12s 8d 
26  William de Feriby  1396  £45 0s 0d  £6 0s 0d 
 
27  Agnet Salvayne  1396  £26 13s 4d  £2 13s 4d 
 
Table 1: Data for Corrodies on a Single Life  
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    Assumed Interest Rate 
No. 
0%  5%  10%  15%  20% 
IRR 
1  7.28 years  9.26 years  14.31 years  £6 14s 4d  £25  1s 0d  8.1% 
2  13.40 years  22.70 years   £0  £26 18s 8d  £33 12s 0d  -2.5% 
3  10.00 years  14.20 years   £0  £13 6s 8d  £20  0s 0d  2.2% 
4  28.13 years  £43 6s 8d  £96 13s 4d  £114 9s 0d  £123  6s 8d  -12.3% 
5  4.76 years  5.55 years  6.72 years  8.85 years  16.64 years  17.7% 
6  9.53 years  13.25 years  32.05 years  £24  0s 7d  £38 0s 5d  3.0% 
7  3.33 years  3.71 years  4.24 years  4.83 years  6.02 years  28.4% 
8  10.00 years  14.20 years  £0  £22 4s 5d  £33  6s 8d  2.2% 
9  6.00 years  7.30 years  9.57 years  16.42 years  £1 13s 4d  12.2% 
10  7.50 years  9.61 years  14.50 years  £2 4s 5d  £6 13s 4d  7.5% 
11  7.50 years  9.61 years  14.50 years  £2 4s 5d  £6 13s 4d  7.5% 
12  3.20 years  3.55 years  4.04 years  4.60 years  5.52 years  29.5% 
13  5.73 years  6.88 years  8.86 years  14.08 years  £1 14s 2d  13.2% 
14  5.15 years  6.10 years  7.54 years  10.52 years  £1 13s 4d  15.8% 
15  15.00 years  28.40 years  £100 0s 0d  £166 13s 4d  £200  0s 0d  -4.2% 
16  10.00 years  14.20 years  £0  £6 13s 4d  £10  0s 0d  2.2% 
17  6.79 years  8.49 years  11.85 years  10s 0d  £7 0s 10d  9.5% 
18  10.46 years  15.16 years  £1 3s 4d  £9 13s 4d  £13 18s 4d  1.4% 
19  8.85 years  11.92 years  22.60 years  £7 7s 9d  £13 0s 10d  4.3% 
20  10.41 years  15.06 years  £1 16s 8d  £16 15 7d  £24 5s 0d  1.5% 
21  8.33 years  11.05 years  18.74 years  £13 6s 8d  £26 13s 4d  5.4% 
22  9.60 years  13.40 years  33.82 years  £17 6s 8d  £27 3s 4d  2.9% 
23  8.53 years  11.39 years  20.13 years  £11 13s 4d  £22 1s 8d  5.0% 
24  8.89 years  12.05 years  23.05 years  £10 0s 0d  £17 10s 0d  4.3% 
25  7.10 years  8.94 years  12.90 years  £2 8s 11d  £11 16s 8d  8.6% 
26  7.50 years  9.61 years  14.51 years  £5 0s 0d  £15 0s 0d  7.5 
27  10.00 years  14.20 years  £0  £8 17s 9d  £13 6s 8d  2.2% 
 
Table 2: Single Life - For each interest rate, the corrody was profitable for the corrodian so long as the 
corrodian lived more than the number of years given in each column. For interest rates which guaranteed  
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the institution a profit, even if the corrodian lived for ever, the table gives the loss (in bold) the corrodian 
would make if they lived forever. The IRR column gives the rate of return on the corrodian’s investment 
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1  John & Joan Chertsey  1418  £133 6s 4d  £10 13s 4d 
2  Thomas & Joan Stone  1418  £150 0s 0d  £10  2s 6d 




4  Robert & Alice Drope  1460  £100 0s 0d  £8  7s 11d 
Thornholm Abbey
10  5  John Cutylere & wife  1440  £13 6s 8d  £2  0s 0d 
6  John Marshall & wife  1392  £45 10s 0d  £3 18s 0d 
7  Robert de Yeverslay & wife  1393  £40 0s 0d  £3 18s 0d 
8  John & Beatrice Cundall  1394  £81 0s 0d  £8 12s 0d 
9  John Willerdby & wife  1394  £46 13s 4d  £5 7s 0d 
10  John de Thwayte & wife  1394  £20 0s 0d  £2 5s 6d 
11  William Bell & wife  1394  £59 3s 4d  £6 13s 4d 
12  John Burden & wife  1394  £41 0s 0d  £4 16s 0d 
13  John Eldeslay & wife  1395  £40 0s 0d  £5 16s 8d 
14  William Sergeant & wife  1395  £50 0s 0d  £3 18s 6d 
15  Robert de Hopton & wife  1395  £66 13s 4d  £6 6s 8d 
16  Adam de Burton & wife  1395  £80  0s 0d  £8 7s 0d 
17  Stephen Nightingale & wife  1395  £66 13s 4d  £5 10s 2d 
18  William Cokk & wife  1395  £44 0s 0d  £4 15s 0d 
19 
Beatrice de Selby &  
Isabelle de Kyghelay 
1396  £66 13s 4d  £4  7s 0d 
20  Simon Smyth & wife  1396  £56 13s 4d  £5 13s 4d 
21  Robert Bird & wife  1396  £50 0s 0d  £5 2s 0d 
22  Robert Bernard & wife  1396  £23 6s 8d  £2 5s 10d 







   
24  Alan Bradley & wife  1396  £33 6s 8d  £3 15s 4d 
 
                                                 
9 Harvey (1993), pp. 248, 250. 
10 Thompson (1929), p. 364. 
11 TNA C270/21  
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      Table 3: Data for Corrodies on Joint Lives  
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    Assumed Interest Rate 
No. 
0%  5%  10%  15%  20% 
IRR 
1  12.50 years  20.10 years  £26 13s 0d  £62  4s 1d  £79 19s 8d  -0.6% 
2  14.81 years  27.64 years  £48 15s 0d  £82 10s 0d  £99  7s 6d  -3.1% 
3  4.76 years  5.55 years  6.72 years  8.85 years  16.64 years  18.2% 
4  11.91 years  18.53 years  £16  0s 10d  £44  0s 7d  £58  0s 5d  0.1% 
5  6.67 years  8.30 years  11.49 years  £0  £3  6s 8d  10.5% 
6  11.67 years  17.90 years  £6 10s 0d  £19 10s 0d  £26 0s 0d  0.4% 
7  10.26 years  14.71 years  £1 0s 0d  £14 0s 0d  £20 10s 0d  2.5% 
8  9.36 years  12.90 years  28.83 years  £23  6s 8d  £37 15s 0d  4.0% 
9  9.72 years  13.62 years  37.47 years  £16 6s 8d  £25 5s 0d  3.4% 
10  8.79 years  11.83 years  22.16 years  £4 16 8d  £8 12s 6d  5.1% 
11  8.88 years  12.02 years  22.84 years  £14 14s 5d  £25 16s 8d  5.0% 
12  8.54 years  11.40 years  20.19 years  £9 0s 0d  £17 0s 0d  5.7% 
13  6.86 years  8.58 years  12.14 years  £1 2s 3d  £10 16s 8d  9.9% 
14  12.74 years  20.74 years  £10 15s 0d  £23 16s 8d  £30 7s 6d  -0.9% 
15  10.53 years  15.31 years  £3  6s 8d  £24 8s 11d  £35 0s 0d  2.1% 
16  9.58 years  13.35 years  33.27 years  £24 6s 8d  £38 5s 0d  3.6% 
17  12.10 years  19.05 years  £11 11s 8d  £29 18s 11d  £39 2s 6d  -0.1% 
18  9.26 years  12.72 years  27.34 years  £12 6s 8d  £20 5s 0d  4.2% 
19  15.33 years  29.76 years  £23  3s 4d  £37 13s 4d  £44 18s 4d  -3.6% 
20  10.00 years  14.20 years  £0  £18 17s 9d  £28 6s 8d  2.9% 
21  9.80 years  13.78 years  41.24 years  £16 0s 0d  £24 10s 0d  3.2% 
22  10.18 years  14.56 years  8s 4d  £8 1s 1d  £11 17s 6d  2.6% 
23  11.81 years  18.28 years  £10 11s 8d  £30 2s 3d  £39 17s 6d  0.3% 
24  8.85 years  11.93 years  22.64 years  £8 4s 5d  £14 10s 0d  5.0% 
 
Table 4: Joint Lives - For each interest rate, the corrody was profitable for the corrodian so long as the 
corrodian lived more than the number of years given in each column. For interest rates which guaranteed 
the institution a profit, even if the corrodian lived for ever, the table gives the loss (in bold) the corrodian  
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would make if they lived forever. The IRR column gives the rate of return on the corrodian’s investment 
in the corrody. 
 
 
 
 